Faguet, Jean-Paul 
ORCID: 0000-0002-7188-0098
(2002)
A model of central vs decentralized government: self-interest and mis-allocation in Bolivia.
DESTIN working papers (39).
London School of Economics and Political Science. Development Studies Institute, London, UK.
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Abstract
The recent, much remarked upon decentralization in Bolivia produced four important changes in the nation’s public finances: (1) a sharp fall in the geographic concentration of investment; (2) a sea-change in the uses of investment away from infrastructure towards the social sectors; (3) a significant increase in government responsiveness to local needs; and (4) increased investment in poorer municipalities. Existing theoretical treatments of decentralization cannot account for these phenomena. This paper develops a model of government which relies on political bargaining between municipal representatives and central government agents over the allocation of public resources. By invoking central government self-interest, I can explain the Bolivian experience. Lastly I introduce the concept of residual power, which underpins the model, as key to understanding decentralization. Analyzing the location of residual power in a political system can help cut through the thicket of contradictory claims that fill the decentralization literature.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/DESTIN |
| Additional Information: | © 2003 The Author |
| Divisions: | STICERD International Development |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JC Political theory |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Dec 2008 14:43 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 19:46 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/13421 |
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