Xu, Zhongwei (2025) Belief inertia and awareness-evidence commutativity. Analysis. ISSN 0003-2638 (In Press)
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Identification Number: 10.1093/analys/anaf085
Abstract
It is alleged that imprecise probabilism can render one unable to update one’s credence in light of new evidence. While such belief inertia by itself is already quite worrying, I argue that it has other worrying epistemic implications that were previously unnoticed. It opens the possibility that one’s doxastic state depends not only on the evidence one has but also on the temporal order between awareness growth and evidence acquisition. I find this implication difficult to accept.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | © 2025 the Author(s) |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Oct 2025 09:36 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Oct 2025 13:18 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/129699 |
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