Weaponized legal dependence: how states repress their globalized oligarchs

Kalyanpur, Nikhil ORCID: 0000-0001-6200-1509 (2025) Weaponized legal dependence: how states repress their globalized oligarchs. Review of International Studies. ISSN 0260-2105 (In Press)

Text (WeaponizedLegalDependence.RIS.EditorialSubmission) - Accepted Version Pending embargo until 1 January 2100. Download (511kB)

Abstract

States increasingly confront security threats from exiled economic elites who retain power through offshore wealth, political influence, and informational leverage. This paper introduces the concept of weaponized legal dependence to explain why and how states file commercial lawsuits against their own citizens in foreign courts—particularly in global legal hubs like London—to neutralize these transnational plutocratic threats. While conventional tools of transnational repression (e.g., extradition, abduction, information warfare) target dissidents’ legitimacy or messaging power, only foreign litigation can directly constrain the material assets that underpin a plutocrat’s influence. However, initiating extraterritorial claims is costly, risky, and entails a partial surrender of sovereignty to liberal jurisdictions. I argue that states resort to these legal strategies when they face power parity with plutocrats—situations where neither side has hierarchical control, prompting political conflict to spill into foreign legal systems under the guise of commercial dispute. Drawing on 60 interviews with legal practitioners and case studies from Russia and Kazakhstan, this paper shows how states instrumentalize the credibility of liberal legal institutions to reclaim offshore assets and delegitimize their rivals. In doing so, illiberal regimes exploit liberal infrastructure, turning courts meant to enforce commercial norms into battlegrounds of domestic power politics.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2025 The Author(s)
Divisions:	International Relations
Subjects:	K Law J Political Science > JZ International relations
Date Deposited:	31 Jul 2025 09:18
Last Modified:	01 Aug 2025 15:12
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/128969

Actions (login required)

View Item