A defence of informed preference satisfaction theories of welfare

Fumagalli, Roberto (2025) A defence of informed preference satisfaction theories of welfare. Philosophy of Science. ISSN 0031-8248

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Abstract

This article defends informed preference satisfaction theories of welfare against the most influential objections put forward in the economic and philosophy of science literatures. The article explicates and addresses in turn: the objection from inner rational agents; the objection from unfeasible preference reconstruction; the objection from dubious normative commitments; the objection from conceptual ambiguity; and the objection from conceptual replacement. My defence does not exclude that preference satisfaction theories of welfare face significant conceptual and practical challenges. Still, if correct, it demonstrates that philosophers/welfare economists are justified in relying on specific versions of such theories, namely informed preference satisfaction theories.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2025 The Author(s)
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) H Social Sciences
Date Deposited:	08 Apr 2025 10:45
Last Modified:	08 Jul 2025 22:04
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/127853

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