Mapping content: why cognitive maps are non-conceptual mental states

Schwartz, Ari ORCID: 0000-0002-2777-1732 and Fresco, Nir (2025) Mapping content: why cognitive maps are non-conceptual mental states. Synthese, 205 (3). ISSN 0039-7857

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Abstract

Cognitive maps play a crucial role in mammalian navigation. They provide the organism with information about its own location and the locations of landmarks within known environments. Cognitive maps have yet to receive ample attention in philosophy. In this article, we argue that cognitive maps should not be understood along the lines of conceptual mental states, such as beliefs and desires. They are more plausibly understood to be non-conceptual. We clarify what is at stake in this claim, and offer two empirically-informed arguments in its favor. Both arguments submit that cognitive maps are probably non-conceptual because their representational structure seems to differ from that of conceptual mental states.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2025 The Authors
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	27 Jan 2025 11:45
Last Modified:	10 Mar 2025 17:04
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/127068

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