Lobbying for globalisation

Blanga-Gubbay, Michael, Conconi, Paola and Parenti, Mathieu (2024) Lobbying for globalisation. Economic Journal. ISSN 0013-0133

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Abstract

Using detailed information from lobbying reports filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, we construct a unique dataset that allows us to identify which firms lobby on free trade agreements negotiated by the United States, their positions (in favour or against) and their lobbying efforts on the ratification of each trade agreement. Using this dataset, we show that lobbying on free trade agreements is dominated by large multinational firms, which are in favour of these agreements. On the intensive margin, we exploit exogenous variation across free trade agreements to show that individual firms put more effort into supporting agreements that generate larger potential gains—larger improvements in their access to foreign consumers and suppliers and smaller increases in domestic competition—and that are more likely to be opposed by politicians. To rationalise these findings, we develop a new model of endogenous lobbying on trade agreements. In this model, heterogeneous firms select into trade and choose whether and how much to spend lobbying on the ratification of a free trade agreement, and politicians may be biased in favour of or against the agreement.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2024 The Author(s
Divisions:	Centre for Economic Performance
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HF Commerce J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations; International Trade Organizations F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations and International Political Economy > F53 - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
Date Deposited:	05 Dec 2024 09:39
Last Modified:	12 Dec 2024 04:36
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/126258

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