Henriques, David (2023) A combinatorial auction to sell TV broadcasting rights in league sports. Telecommunications Policy, 47 (6). ISSN 0308-5961
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
The centralized sale of TV broadcasting rights in league sports constitutes a cartel which in many European countries is allowed only if it complies with certain conditions set by competition authorities. Two of the most important conditions are: i) partial unbundling, i.e. the rights must be unbundled into several separate packages; and ii) the no-single-buyer rule, i.e. the packages must be sold to different broadcasters. This article shows how a combinatorial auction can be employed to sell broadcasting rights allocating them endogenously based on the broadcasters’ bids and, thus, without requiring the seller to pre-determine the packages of such rights. This feature can address various competition policy issues, including facilitating market entry and preventing coordination among bidders. Also, a combinatorial auction has the potential to achieve higher levels of allocative efficiency and higher revenue levels compared to auctions with pre-determined packages of broadcasting rights.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | © 2023 Elsevier Ltd. A |
| Divisions: | Media and Communications |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HE Transportation and Communications |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Oct 2024 11:39 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Dec 2024 04:33 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/125903 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
