A combinatorial auction to sell TV broadcasting rights in league sports

Henriques, David (2023) A combinatorial auction to sell TV broadcasting rights in league sports. Telecommunications Policy, 47 (6). ISSN 0308-5961

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Abstract

The centralized sale of TV broadcasting rights in league sports constitutes a cartel which in many European countries is allowed only if it complies with certain conditions set by competition authorities. Two of the most important conditions are: i) partial unbundling, i.e. the rights must be unbundled into several separate packages; and ii) the no-single-buyer rule, i.e. the packages must be sold to different broadcasters. This article shows how a combinatorial auction can be employed to sell broadcasting rights allocating them endogenously based on the broadcasters’ bids and, thus, without requiring the seller to pre-determine the packages of such rights. This feature can address various competition policy issues, including facilitating market entry and preventing coordination among bidders. Also, a combinatorial auction has the potential to achieve higher levels of allocative efficiency and higher revenue levels compared to auctions with pre-determined packages of broadcasting rights.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2023 Elsevier Ltd. A
Divisions:	Media and Communications
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HE Transportation and Communications
Date Deposited:	28 Oct 2024 11:39
Last Modified:	04 Jul 2025 16:21
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/125903

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