Barrett, Scott (2024) Property rights to the world’s (linear) ocean fisheries in customary international law. Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 11 (3). 689 - 718. ISSN 2333-5955
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
I model the ocean as an array of lines set within a two-dimensional frame and show how the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) emerged as an equilibrium in customary international law. I find that custom codifies the efficient Nash equilibrium of enclosure for nearshore fisheries. For highly migratory and offshore fisheries, enclosure is inefficient, and customary law supports a more efficient " free sea” regime. The model also identifies the trigger for changes in property rights and the reason choice of a particular limit, like the current 200-mile zone, is arbitrary. In an asymmetric, regional sea, I find that the scope of the EEZ is determined by the relative power of coastal and distant water states, and need not be efficient. Finally, I find that proposals to nationalize the seas or ban fishing on the high seas are neither efficient nor supportable as equilibria in customary law.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | © 2024 The Association of Environmental and Resource Economists |
| Divisions: | Grantham Research Institute |
| Subjects: | K Law > KZ Law of Nations H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HF Commerce |
| JEL classification: | F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations and International Political Economy > F50 - General K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K33 - International Law Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q22 - Fishery; Aquaculture |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Sep 2024 10:09 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Oct 2024 10:00 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/125568 |
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