Persistent unilateral action

Foster, David ORCID: 0000-0002-5835-9652 (2024) Persistent unilateral action. Political Science Research and Methods. ISSN 2049-8470

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Abstract

Many believe that weaker legal constraints make unilateral action easier to reverse than legislation. Yet in some cases, unilateralism survives a successor's determined opposition. I argue that legislative persistence and unilateral transience may arise not only from differences in legal status but also from a selection effect: unilateralism and subsequent rescission can both stem from weak underlying policy-demanding groups. But if unilateralism itself alters the landscape of group power through policy feedback effects, it can survive a purportedly opposed new president. An example is the Trump Administration's failure to depart from the Obama Justice Department's lax stance on cannabis. Weak constituents’ policy demands may thus need to rely on a sympathetic president's unilateral action to begin a feedback loop, subsequently softening opposition. This paper therefore identifies unilateral action as a key tool for shifting policy in an enduring way, explaining its success or failure in terms of interest group power.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2024 The Author
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	J Political Science
Date Deposited:	29 Aug 2024 13:18
Last Modified:	17 Oct 2024 18:19
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/125279

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