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The architecture of macroprudential policy: delegation and coordination

Bean, Charles ORCID: 0000-0002-6524-8280 (2022) The architecture of macroprudential policy: delegation and coordination. In: Holzmann, Robert and Restoy, Fernando, (eds.) Central Banks and Supervisory Architecture in Europe: Lessons from Crises in the 21st Century. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 96 - 107. ISBN 9781802208887

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Identification Number: 10.4337/9781802208894.00015

Abstract

There are technical and political economy reasons for the delegation of macroprudential policy but the absence of a measurable objective hinders accountability while some borrower-focussed policies may raise questions of political legitimacy. Macroprudential and monetary policies theoretically do not need to reside in the same agency but in practice it may be helpful. Finally, the financial market turbulence in spring 2020 highlighted that stresses may arise beyond the regulatory perimeter, emphasising the need for vigilance.

Item Type: Book Section
Official URL: https://www.e-elgar.com/shop/gbp/central-banks-and...
Additional Information: © 2022 Oesterreichische Nationalbank
Divisions: Economics
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Date Deposited: 04 Jun 2024 14:48
Last Modified: 11 Dec 2024 18:14
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/123763

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