Binmore, Ken G, Shaked, Avner and Sutton, John (1989) An outside option experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (4). pp. 753-770. ISSN 0033-5533
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
In the economic modeling of bargaining, outside options have often been naively treated by taking them as the disagreement payoffs in an application of the Nash bargaining solution. The paper contrasts this method of predicting outcomes with that obtained from an analysis of optimal strategic behavior in a natural game-theoretic model of the bargaining process. The strategic analysis predicts that the outside options will be irrelevant to the final deal unless a bargainer would then go elsewhere. An experiment is reported which indicates that this prediction performs well in comparison with the conventional predictor.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/ |
| Additional Information: | © 1989 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| Divisions: | Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory |
| Date Deposited: | 27 Apr 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 21:54 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/1230 |
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