Resource windfalls, political regimes, and political stability

Caselli, Francesco ORCID: 0009-0001-5191-7156 and Tesei, Andrea (2011) Resource windfalls, political regimes, and political stability. CEP Discussion Papers (CEPDP1091). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance, London, UK.

Text - Published Version Download (488kB)

• Author
• https://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/...

Abstract

We study theoretically and empirically whether natural resource windfalls affect political regimes. We document the following regularities. Natural resource windfalls have no effect on the political system when they occur in democracies. However, windfalls have significant political consequences in autocracies. In particular, when an autocratic country receives a positive shock to its flow of resource rents it responds by becoming even more autocratic. Furthermore, there is heterogeneity in the response of autocracies. In deeply entrenched autocracies the effect of windfalls on politics is virtually nil, while in moderately entrenched autocracies windfalls significantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of the political system. To frame the empirical work we present a simple model in which political incumbents choose the degree of political contestability by deciding how much to spend on vote-buying, bullying, or outright repression. Potential challengers decide whether or not to try to unseat the incumbent and replace him. The model uncovers a reason for the asymmetric impact of resource windfalls on democracies and autocracies, as well as the differential impact within autocratic regimes.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/discussion...
Additional Information:	©2011 The Author(s)
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q33 - Resource Booms
Date Deposited:	22 Feb 2024 13:03
Last Modified:	01 Oct 2024 03:21
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/121753

Actions (login required)

View Item