Accountability through mutual attunement: how can parliamentary hearings connect the elected and the unelected?

Eriksen, Andreas and Katsaitis, A (2023) Accountability through mutual attunement: how can parliamentary hearings connect the elected and the unelected? Public Policy and Administration, 38 (3). 352 - 373. ISSN 0952-0767

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Abstract

The increased authority delegated to independent agencies raises questions about the conditions of politically accountable governance, and specifically parliament’s role as a representative institution. Focusing on committee hearings as an accountability mechanism, we ask: How can a parliament employ hearings to ensure that the ends pursued by agencies have a democratic foundation? We propose a model of “mutual attunement” where accountability relations presuppose a process of working-out shared understandings of the ends, means and circumstances of policy needs. We test our argument through a case study assessing the interaction between the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic & Monetary Affairs and the European Securities and Markets Authority. Theoretically, we contribute to discussions on agency accountability and European governance, while providing a novel conceptual model and the first analysis of its kind.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://journals.sagepub.com/home/PPA
Additional Information:	© 2020 The Author(s)
Divisions:	Government
Subjects:	J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General) J Political Science > JC Political theory
Date Deposited:	05 Feb 2024 10:15
Last Modified:	03 Nov 2025 20:58
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/121645

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