Ornelas, Emanuel ORCID: 0000-0001-8330-8745 and Turner, John L.
(2024)
The costs and benefits of rules of origin in modern free trade agreements.
Journal of International Economics, 147.
ISSN 0022-1996
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Text (The Cost and benefits of Rules of Origin in Modern Free Trade Agreements)
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Abstract
Rules of origin offer preferred market access for final goods whose inputs originate mostly within a free trade agreement. Governments often champion such rules for boosting investment. We use a property-rights framework to study when this motivation is justifiable. The rule does not bind for all supply chains, as some (very-high-productivity) suppliers comply in an unconstrained way and some (very-low-productivity) suppliers do not comply. For those suppliers it affects, the rule both increases investments and induces excessive sourcing within the trading bloc. From a social standpoint, the best rule binds for relatively high-productivity suppliers, because the marginal net welfare gain from tightening it increases with productivity. Therefore, when industry productivity is high, a strict rule is socially desirable. In contrast, a lenient rule binds for relatively low-productivity suppliers and is more likely to be harmful. For output tariffs that are not too high, a sufficiently strict rule ensures welfare gains.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-i... |
Additional Information: | © 2023 Elsevier B.V. |
Divisions: | Centre for Economic Performance |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
JEL classification: | F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations; International Trade Organizations F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F15 - Economic Integration L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates; Subsidiaries D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights |
Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2024 13:06 |
Last Modified: | 15 Aug 2024 19:57 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/121408 |
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