The dynamics of default and debt reorganization

Mella-Barral, Pierre (1996) The dynamics of default and debt reorganization. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (230). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

This article documents the fact that when debtors decide to default on their obligations too early, it is in the creditors' collective interest, as residual claimants, to make concessions prior to forcing a costly liquidation. Symmetrically, when debtors prefer to default at an inefficiently late stage, it is in the creditors' interest to propose a departure from the absolute priority rule. This article develops a continuous time pricing model of dynamic debt restructuring that reflects the crucial influence of the two counterparties' relative bargaining power. Simple and intuitive path-dependent pricing formulae are derived for equity and debt. The debt capacity as well as the evolution of the firm's capital structure throughout its existence is provided.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.fmg.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 1996 The Author(s)
Divisions:	Financial Markets Group
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G30 - General G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G20 - General
Date Deposited:	23 May 2023 10:24
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 04:35
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/119173

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