The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options

Chaigneau, Pierre and Sahuguet, Nicolas (2012) The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (713). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Text (DP713) - Published Version Download (371kB)

• https://www.fmg.ac.uk/publications/discu...

Abstract

We develop a stylized model of efficient contracting in which firms compete for CEOs. The optimal contracts are designed to retain and insure CEOs. The retention motive explains pay-for-luck in executive compensation, while the insurance feature explains asymmetric pay-for-luck. We show that the optimal contract can be implemented with stockoptions based on a single performance measure which does not filter out luck. When the capacity to dismiss underperforming CEOs differs across firms, and the ability of different CEOs is more or less precisely estimated ex-ante, endogenous matching between CEOs and firms can explain the observed association between pay-for-luck and bad corporate governance. The model also predicts that an improvement in the governance of badly governed firms has spillover effects that increase CEO pay in all firms.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.fmg.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2012 The Authors
Divisions:	Financial Markets Group
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
Date Deposited:	08 Jun 2023 23:04
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 04:30
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/119040

Actions (login required)

View Item