Auction design objectives and baseline decisions

Myers, Geoffrey ORCID: 0000-0002-0764-6192 (2023) Auction design objectives and baseline decisions. In: Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy. LSE Press, London, UK, 115 - 136. ISBN 9781911712039

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Item Type:	Book Section
Official URL:	https://press.lse.ac.uk/site/books/m/10.31389/lsep...
Additional Information:	© 2023 The Author
Divisions:	Government
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HE Transportation and Communications J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory T Technology > T Technology (General)
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D44 - Auctions
Date Deposited:	22 Feb 2023 11:39
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 18:08
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/118244

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