Scientists are epistemic consequentialists about imagination

Stuart, Michael T. (2022) Scientists are epistemic consequentialists about imagination. Philosophy of Science. pp. 1-22. ISSN 0031-8248

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Abstract

Scientists imagine for epistemic reasons, and these imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean for an imagining to be epistemically better or worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that present different answers to this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence that scientists adopt each of these different epistemic frameworks with respect to imagination, but argues that the way they do this is best explained if scientists are fundamentally epistemic consequentialists about imagination.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/philosophy...
Additional Information:	© 2022 The Author
Divisions:	CPNSS
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	21 Sep 2022 09:18
Last Modified:	12 Dec 2024 03:16
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/116644

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