Basedow, Johann Robert
ORCID: 0000-0001-6463-4860
(2022)
Why de-judicialize? Explaining state preferences on judicialization in World Trade Organization dispute settlement body and investor-to-state dispute settlement reforms.
Regulation and Governance, 16 (4).
1362 - 1381.
ISSN 1748-5983
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Abstract
Judicialization scholarship suggests that states must seek the de-judicialization of international dispute settlement mechanisms to regain regulatory space. Why then do some states seek a de-judicialization yet others increased judicialization of dispute settlement mechanisms in their pursuit of regulatory space? This article advances a twofold argument. First, the concept of judicialization has been erroneously conflated with state perceptions of regulatory space under dispute settlement mechanisms. States aspiring to consolidate regulatory space may pursue de-judicialization and increased judicialization alike. Second, states' preferences for de-judicialization or increased judicialization to regain regulatory space should largely depend on conceptions of legitimate international law as either intergovernmental contracts or cosmopolitan quasi-constitutional order. The article illustrates these arguments at the example of US and EU efforts to reform the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization and investor-to-state dispute settlement. Both seek to increase regulatory space. Yet, the USA pursues de-judicialization while the EU promotes judicialization.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/17485991 |
| Additional Information: | © 2021 The Author |
| Divisions: | European Institute |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JZ International relations K Law > KZ Law of Nations |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Aug 2021 11:39 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Dec 2025 21:55 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/111624 |
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