Factive inferentialism and the puzzle of model-based explanation

Verreault-Julien, Philippe (2021) Factive inferentialism and the puzzle of model-based explanation. Synthese, 199 (3-4). 10039 – 10057. ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

Highly idealized models may serve various epistemic functions, notably explanation, in virtue of representing the world. Inferentialism provides a prima facie compelling characterization of what constitutes the representation relation. In this paper, I argue that what I call factive inferentialism does not provide a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of model-based — factive — explanation. In particular, I show that making explanatory counterfactual inferences is not a sufficient guide for accurate representation, factivity, or realism. I conclude by calling for a more explicit specification of model-world mismatches and properties imputation.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.springer.com/journal/11229
Additional Information:	© 2021 The Author
Divisions:	CPNSS
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	02 Jun 2021 09:51
Last Modified:	15 Apr 2024 14:45
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/110749

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