Do institutional transplants succeed? Regulating raiffeisen cooperatives in South India, 1930-1960

Nath, Maanik (2021) Do institutional transplants succeed? Regulating raiffeisen cooperatives in South India, 1930-1960. Business History Review, 95 (1). 59 - 85. ISSN 0007-6805

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Abstract

The government in British-ruled India established cooperative banks to compete with private moneylenders in the rural credit market. State officials expected greater competition to increase the supply of low-cost credit, thereby expanding investment potential for the rural poor. Cooperatives did increase credit supply but captured a small share of the credit market and reported net losses throughout the late colonial and early postcolonial period. The article asks why this experiment did not succeed and offers two explanations. First, low savings restricted the role of social capital and mutual supervision as methods of financial regulation in the cooperative sector. Second, a political-economic ideology that privileged equity over efficiency made for weak administrative regulation.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/business-h...
Additional Information:	© 2021 The President and Fellows of Harvard College
Divisions:	Economic History
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	N - Economic History > N2 - Financial Markets and Institutions > N25 - Asia including Middle East
Date Deposited:	13 Apr 2021 14:45
Last Modified:	17 Apr 2024 05:18
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/109856

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