Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs

Eliaz, Kfir, Spiegler, Ran and Thysen, Heidi C. (2021) Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs. European Economic Review, 134. ISSN 0014-2921

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Abstract

We study a two-action, two-state pure persuasion game in which the receiver has non-rational expectations. The sender can add ambiguity to his message by pooling it with other messages. This can be likened to selective redaction of the original message. The receiver knows the sender's message strategy but not his redaction strategy, and uses only the former to draw inferences from the redacted message. We characterize the highest probability of persuasion attainable by the sender under these conditions.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/european-eco...
Additional Information:	© 2021 Elsevier B.V.
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited:	31 Mar 2021 14:18
Last Modified:	17 Oct 2024 17:37
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/109842

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