The impossibility of a Bayesian liberal?

Bosworth, William and Taylor, Brad (2022) The impossibility of a Bayesian liberal? Journal of Politics, 84 (4). 2023 - 2033. ISSN 0022-3816

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Abstract

Aumann’s theorem states that no individual should agree to disagree under a range of assumptions. Political liberalism appears to presuppose these assumptions with the idealized conditions of public reason. We argue that Aumann’s theorem demonstrates they nevertheless cannot be simultaneously held with what is arguably political liberalism’s most central tenet. That is, the tenet of reasonable pluralism, which implies we can rationally agree to disagree over conceptions of the good. We finish by elaborating a way of relaxing one of the theorem’s axioms that arguably lends itself to a coherent account of political liberalism, namely, the condition of indexical independence.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jop/current
Additional Information:	© 2022 The Southern Political Science Association
Divisions:	Government
Subjects:	J Political Science > JC Political theory
Date Deposited:	30 Sep 2020 10:45
Last Modified:	07 Apr 2024 05:06
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/106659

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