The trade-off between insurance and incentives in differentiated unemployment policies

Spinnewijn, Johannes ORCID: 0000-0002-7963-5847 (2020) The trade-off between insurance and incentives in differentiated unemployment policies. Fiscal Studies, 41 (1). 101 - 127. ISSN 0143-5671

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Abstract

In this paper, I revisit the central trade-off between insurance and incentives in the design of unemployment insurance policies. The generosity of unemployment insurance benefits differs not only across countries, but also across workers within countries. After illustrating some important dimensions of heterogeneity in a cross-country analysis, I extend the standard Baily–Chetty formula to identify the key empirical moments and elasticities required to evaluate the differentiated unemployment policy within a country. I also review some prior work and aim to provide guidance for future work trying to inform the design of unemployment policies.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14755890
Additional Information:	© 2020 The Author
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
JEL classification:	H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H20 - General J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies > J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies > J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Date Deposited:	03 Jun 2020 14:18
Last Modified:	17 Oct 2024 18:28
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/104718

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