How intellectual communities progress

Ross, Lewis D. (2020) How intellectual communities progress. Episteme. ISSN 1742-3600

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Abstract

Recent work takes both philosophical and scientific progress to consist in acquiring factive epistemic states such as knowledge. However, much of this work leaves unclear what entity is the subject of these epistemic states. Furthermore, by focusing only on states like knowledge, we overlook progress in intermediate cases between ignorance and knowledge - for example, many now celebrated theories were initially so controversial that they were not known. This paper develops an improved framework for thinking about intellectual progress. Firstly, I argue that we should think of progress relative to the epistemic position of an intellectual community rather than individual inquirers. Secondly, I show how focusing on the extended process of inquiry (rather than the mere presence or absence of states like knowledge) provides a better evaluation of different types of progress. This includes progress through formulating worthwhile questions, acquiring new evidence, and increasing credence on the right answers to these questions. I close by considering the ramifications for philosophical progress, suggesting that my account supports rejecting the most negative views while allowing us to articulate different varieties of optimism and pessimism.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme
Additional Information:	© 2020 Cambridge University Press
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Date Deposited:	06 Apr 2020 08:12
Last Modified:	16 Apr 2024 22:39
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/103972

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