Thoma, Johanna ORCID: 0000-0002-1364-4521
(2019)
Judgementalism about normative decision theory.
Synthese.
ISSN 0039-7857
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Abstract
Judgementalism is an interpretation of normative decision theory according to which preferences are all-things-considered judgements of relative desirability, and the only attitudes that rationally constrain choice. The defence of judgementalism we find in Richard Bradley’s Decision Theory with a Human Face (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017) relies on a kind of internalism about the requirements of rationality, according to which they supervene on an agent’s mental states, and in particular those she can reason from. I argue that even if we grant such internalism, attitudes other than preferences in the judgementalist sense rationally constrain choice. This ultimately supports a different interpretation of preference.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | https://link.springer.com/journal/11229 |
Additional Information: | © 2019 The Author |
Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Date Deposited: | 20 Nov 2019 12:48 |
Last Modified: | 16 Aug 2024 05:36 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/102568 |
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