Gottlieb, Daniel 
ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185
(2014)
Imperfect memory and choice under risk.
Games and Economic Behavior, 85.
127 - 158.
ISSN 0899-8256
Identification Number: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.013
Abstract
This paper presents a model of choice based on imperfect memory and self-deception. I assume that people have preferences over their own attributes (e.g., skill, knowledge, or competence) and can manipulate their memories. The model provides a prior-dependent theory of regret aversion and allows for prior-dependent information attitudes. It implies that behavior will converge to the one predicted by expected utility theory after a choice has been faced a sufficiently large number of times.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/games-and-ec... |
| Additional Information: | © 2013 Elsevier Inc. |
| Divisions: | Management |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology |
| JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General |
| Date Deposited: | 26 Oct 2019 12:06 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Nov 2024 05:33 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/102230 |
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