Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185
(2019)
The informativeness principle without the first-order approach.
Games and Economic Behavior, 113.
743 - 755.
ISSN 0899-8256
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Text (The generalized informativeness principle)
- Accepted Version
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Abstract
Holmström (1979) provides a condition for a signal to have positive value assuming the validity of the first-order approach. This paper extends Holmström's analysis to settings where the first-order approach may not hold. We provide a new condition for a signal to have positive value that takes non-local incentive constraints into account and holds generically. Our condition is the weakest condition possible in the absence of restrictions on the utility function.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | https://www.journals.elsevier.com/games-and-econom... |
Additional Information: | © 2019 Elsevier B.V. |
Divisions: | Management |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic |
Date Deposited: | 26 Oct 2019 11:48 |
Last Modified: | 16 Aug 2024 04:51 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/102226 |
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