Farley, Felix (2017) A case for artificial intelligence (AI) rights. LSE Undergraduate Political Review (30 Nov 2017). Blog Entry.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
The subject of this essay is a hitherto hypothetical entity, although one that leading computer scientists predict will emerge this century, namely: human-level artificial general intelligence (hereafter AGI). This essay will explore the ethical standing of AGI to provide a precedent for the legal structures that will be necessitated upon its invention. I will begin by explaining why both Kantian and Utilitarian criteria require us to acknowledge the rights of AGI insofar as it is rational, autonomous and sensitive. I will then argue that the inequality of humans and AGI should be understood as a matter of property rights and that AI rights ought to be limited in Hohfeldian terms to claim-rights against arbitrary affliction.
Item Type: | Online resource (Blog Entry) |
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Official URL: | https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lseupr/ |
Additional Information: | © 2017 The Author |
Divisions: | LSE |
Subjects: | Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA76 Computer software B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics |
Date Deposited: | 04 Oct 2019 14:54 |
Last Modified: | 14 Sep 2024 01:56 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/101861 |
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