Vredenburgh, Kaitlyn Ann (2020) A unificationist defence of revealed preferences. Economics and Philosophy, 36 (1). 149 - 169. ISSN 0266-2671
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Revealed preference approaches to modelling agents’ choices face two seemingly devastating explanatory objections. The no self-explanation objection imputes a problematic explanatory circularity to revealed preference approaches, while the causal explanation objection argues that, all things equal, a scientific theory should provide causal explanations, but revealed preference approaches decidedly do not. Both objections assume a view of explanation, the constraint-based view, that the revealed preference theorist ought to reject. Instead, the revealed preference theorist should adopt a unificationist account of explanation, allowing her to escape the two explanatory problems discussed in this paper.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/economics-... |
| Additional Information: | © 2019 Cambridge University Press |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Sep 2019 11:45 |
| Last Modified: | 16 Apr 2024 17:09 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/101625 |
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