Howson, Colin (2019) A better way of framing Williamson’s coin-tossing argument, but it still does not work. Philosophy of Science, 86 (2). pp. 366-374. ISSN 0031-8248
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Timothy Williamson claimed to prove with a coin-tossing example that hyperreal probabilities cannot save the principle of regularity. A premise of his argument is that two specified infinitary events must be assigned the same probability because, he claims, they are isomorphic. But as has been pointed out, they are not isomorphic. A way of framing Williamson’s argument that does not make it depend on the isomorphism claim is in terms of shifts in Bernoulli processes, the usual mathematical model of sequential coin tossing. But even so framed, the argument still fails.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | © 2019 Philosophy of Science Association |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) Q Science > QA Mathematics |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Apr 2019 08:54 |
| Last Modified: | 20 Sep 2024 02:42 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/100411 |
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