On the explanatory depth and pragmatic value of coarse-grained, probabilistic, causal explanations

Kinney, David (2019) On the explanatory depth and pragmatic value of coarse-grained, probabilistic, causal explanations. Philosophy of Science, 86 (1). pp. 145-167. ISSN 0031-8248

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Abstract

This article considers the thesis that a more proportional relationship between a cause and its effect yields a more abstract causal explanation of that effect, thereby producing a deeper explanation. This thesis has important implications for choosing the optimal granularity of explanation for a given explanandum. In this article, I argue that this thesis is not generally true of probabilistic causal relationships. In light of this finding, I propose a pragmatic measure of explanatory depth. This measure uses a decision-theoretic model of information pricing to determine the optimal granularity of explanation for a given explanandum, agent, and decision problem.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2019 Philosophy of Science Association
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	Q Science > Q Science (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	05 Mar 2019 11:57
Last Modified:	12 Dec 2024 01:41
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/100190

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