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Three concepts of rights, two of property

Webb, Charlie (2018) Three concepts of rights, two of property. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 38 (2). 246 – 269. ISSN 0143-6503

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Identification Number: 10.1093/ojls/gqy006


Sometimes rights are taken to describe concrete, bottom-line entitlements, sometimes a kind of ground of such entitlements. I suggest that this difference reflects not so much disagreement or uncertainty as to the nature of rights as different applications and senses of the term ‘right’, each expressing a different idea or concept. Much work on rights is compromised by a failure to distinguish these concepts of a right, nowhere more so than in private law, where it accounts for difficulties lawyers have faced when seeking to distinguish personal (in personam) and proprietary (in rem) rights.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2018 Oxford University Press
Divisions: Law
Subjects: K Law > K Law (General)
Date Deposited: 18 Apr 2018 13:22
Last Modified: 10 Feb 2024 06:48

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