Auctions with selective entry

Gentry, Matthew, Li, Tong and Lu, Jingfeng (2017) Auctions with selective entry. Games and Economic Behavior, 105. pp. 104-111. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We consider auctions with entry based on a general analytical framework we call the Arbitrarily Selective (AS) model. We characterize symmetric equilibrium in a broad class of standard auctions within this framework, in the process extending the classic revenue equivalence results of Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994) to environments with endogenous and arbitrarily selective entry. We also explore the relationship between revenue maximization and efficiency, showing that a revenue maximizing seller will typically employ both higher-than-efficient reservation prices and higher-than-efficient entry fees.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.journals.elsevier.com/games-and-econom...
Additional Information:	© 2017 Elsevier Ltd.
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited:	27 Jul 2017 10:29
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 07:29
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/83664

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