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Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions

Toussaert, Séverine (2017) Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 137. pp. 132-144. ISSN 0167-2681

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.001

Abstract

Many experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If intentions matter, then prosociality should depend on whether trust intentions can be credibly conveyed. This conjecture is formalized and tested in a noisy trust game where I vary the extent to which trust can be credibly signaled. I find that the introduction of noise threatens the onset of trust relations and induces players to form more pessimistic beliefs. Therefore policies that increase transparency of the decision-making environment may foster prosociality. However, the potential impact of such policies could be limited by a large heterogeneity in how individuals respond to changes in their information environment.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01672...
Additional Information: © 2017 Elsevier
Divisions: Social Policy
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
JEL classification: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D64 - Altruism
Sets: Departments > Social Policy
Date Deposited: 13 Mar 2017 15:23
Last Modified: 20 Jun 2020 02:26
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/69803

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