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Corporate governance objectives of labor union shareholders: evidence from proxy voting

Agrawal, Ashwini K. (2012) Corporate governance objectives of labor union shareholders: evidence from proxy voting. The Review of Financial Studies, 25 (1). pp. 187-226. ISSN 0893-9454

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Identification Number: 10.1093/rfs/hhr081

Abstract

Labor union pension funds have become increasingly vocal in governance matters; however, their motives are subject to fierce debate. I examine the proxy votes of AFL-CIO union funds around an exogenous change in the union representation of workers across firms. AFL-CIO-affiliated shareholders become significantly less opposed to directors once the AFL-CIO labor organization no longer represents a firm's workers. Other institutional investors, including mutual funds and public pension funds, do not exhibit similar voting behavior. Union opposition is also associated with negative valuation effects. The data suggest that some investors pursue worker interests, rather than maximize shareholder value alone.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: https://academic.oup.com/rfs
Additional Information: © 2011 The Author
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD61 Risk Management
H Social Sciences > HG Finance
K Law > K Law (General)
Sets: Departments > Finance
Collections > Economists Online
Date Deposited: 01 Mar 2017 16:14
Last Modified: 10 Mar 2017 11:20
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/69609

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