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Deference, respect and intensionality

Mahtani, Anna ORCID: 0000-0003-1581-4325 (2017) Deference, respect and intensionality. Philosophical Studies, 174 (1). pp. 163-183. ISSN 0031-8116

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s11098-016-0675-6


This paper is about the standard Reflection Principle (van Fraassen, 1984) and the Group Reflection Principle (Elga, 2007; Bovens & Rabinowicz, 2011; Titelbaum, 2012; Hedden, 2015). I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a time can depend on how that person and that time are designated. In this paper I suggest a way of completing the Reflection Principle and Group Reflection Principle, and I argue that so completed these principles are plausible. In particular, they do not fall foul of the Sleeping Beauty case (Elga, 2000), the Cable Guy Paradox (Hajek, 2005) , Arntzenius' prisoner cases (Arntzenius, 2003), or the Puzzle of the Hats (Bovens & Rabinowicz, 2011).

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2016 The Author © CC BY 4.0
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Date Deposited: 13 Apr 2016 15:25
Last Modified: 20 Sep 2021 02:07
Funders: Leverhulme Trust

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