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Interactive preferences

Nax, Heinrich H., Murphy, Ryan O. and Ackermann, Kurt A. (2015) Interactive preferences. Economics Letters, 135. pp. 133-136. ISSN 0165-1765

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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.08.008

Abstract

Game theory presumes that agents have unique preference orderings over outcomes that prescribe unique preference orderings over actions in response to other players’ actions, independent of other players’ preferences. This independence assumption is necessary to permit game-theoretic best response reasoning, but at odds with introspection, because preferences toward one another often dynamically depend on each other. In this note, we propose a model of interactive preferences. The model is validated with data from a laboratory experiment. The main finding of our study is that pro-sociality diminishes over the course of the interactions.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/economics-letters
Additional Information: © 2015 Elsevier B.V.
Divisions: CPNSS
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Q Science > QA Mathematics
Sets: Research centres and groups > Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)
Date Deposited: 19 Feb 2016 15:11
Last Modified: 20 Jul 2019 02:04
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/65430

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