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What probability probably isn't

Howson, Colin (2015) What probability probably isn't. Analysis, 75 (1). pp. 53-59. ISSN 0003-2638

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Identification Number: 10.1093/analys/anu111


Joyce and others have claimed that degrees of belief are estimates of truth-values and that the probability axioms are conditions of admissibility for these estimates with respect to a scoring rule penalising inaccuracy. In this paper I argue that the claim that the rules of probability are truth-directed in this way depends on an assumption which is both implausible and lacks any supporting evidence, strongly suggesting that the probability axioms have nothing intrinsically to do with truth-directedness.

Item Type: Article
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Additional Information: © 2014 The Author
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited: 11 Nov 2015 11:01
Last Modified: 17 Jul 2024 22:51

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