Howson, Colin (2015) What probability probably isn't. Analysis, 75 (1). pp. 53-59. ISSN 0003-2638
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Identification Number: 10.1093/analys/anu111
Abstract
Joyce and others have claimed that degrees of belief are estimates of truth-values and that the probability axioms are conditions of admissibility for these estimates with respect to a scoring rule penalising inaccuracy. In this paper I argue that the claim that the rules of probability are truth-directed in this way depends on an assumption which is both implausible and lacks any supporting evidence, strongly suggesting that the probability axioms have nothing intrinsically to do with truth-directedness.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/ |
Additional Information: | © 2014 The Author |
Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Date Deposited: | 11 Nov 2015 11:01 |
Last Modified: | 08 Aug 2024 00:57 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/64397 |
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