Stefansson, H. Orii and Bradley, Richard ORCID: 0000-0003-2184-7844 (2015) How valuable are chances? Philosophy of Science, 82 (4). pp. 602-625. ISSN 0031-8248
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Abstract
Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true (or being false), its chance of being true should be a matter of practical indifference. The aim of this paper is to examine whether Chance Neutrality is a requirement of rationality. We prove that given Chance Neutrality, the Principal Principle entails a thesis called Linearity; the centrepiece of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. With this in mind, we argue that the Principal Principle is a requirement of practical rationality but that Linearity is not; and hence, that Chance Neutrality is not rationally required.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://journal.philsci.org/ |
Additional Information: | ©2015 by the Philosophy of Science Association. |
Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic |
Date Deposited: | 21 Jul 2015 13:27 |
Last Modified: | 02 Oct 2024 17:06 |
Projects: | 14-AXA-PDOC-222, AH/J006033/1, AH/I003118/1 |
Funders: | AXA, Arts and Humanities Research Council |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/62780 |
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