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How valuable are chances?

Stefansson, H. Orii and Bradley, Richard ORCID: 0000-0003-2184-7844 (2015) How valuable are chances? Philosophy of Science, 82 (4). pp. 602-625. ISSN 0031-8248

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Identification Number: 10.1086/682915

Abstract

Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true (or being false), its chance of being true should be a matter of practical indifference. The aim of this paper is to examine whether Chance Neutrality is a requirement of rationality. We prove that given Chance Neutrality, the Principal Principle entails a thesis called Linearity; the centrepiece of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. With this in mind, we argue that the Principal Principle is a requirement of practical rationality but that Linearity is not; and hence, that Chance Neutrality is not rationally required.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: http://journal.philsci.org/
Additional Information: ©2015 by the Philosophy of Science Association.
Divisions: Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
CPNSS
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
Date Deposited: 21 Jul 2015 13:27
Last Modified: 20 Oct 2021 02:17
Projects: 14-AXA-PDOC-222, AH/J006033/1, AH/I003118/1
Funders: AXA, Arts and Humanities Research Council
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/62780

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