The strategic dis/advantage of voting early

Dekel, Eddie and Piccione, Michele (2014) The strategic dis/advantage of voting early. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6 (4). pp. 162-179. ISSN 1945-7669

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Abstract

Under sequential voting, voting late enables conditioning on which candidates are viable, while voting early can influence the field of candidates. But the latter effect can be harmful: shrinking the field increases not only the likelihood that future voters vote for one's favorite candidate, but also that they vote for an opponent. Specifically, if one's favorite candidate is significantly better than all others then early voting is disadvantageous and all equilibria are equivalent to simultaneous voting. Conversely, when some other candidate is almost as good then any Markov, symmetric, anonymous equilibrium involves sequential voting (and differs from simultaneous voting).

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.aeaweb.org/aej/mic/index.php
Additional Information:	© 2014 American Economic Association.
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Date Deposited:	19 Mar 2015 14:23
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 06:38
Projects:	R000222823, SES-1227434
Funders:	Economic and Social Research Council, National Science Foundation
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/61288

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