Alonso, Ricardo 
ORCID: 0000-0001-9559-0864
(2014)
Recruitment and selection in organizations.
USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper Series.
University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
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Abstract
This paper studies employer recruitment and selection of job applicants when productivity is match-specific. Job-seekers have private, noisy assessments of their match value and the firm performs noisy interviews. Job-seekers' willingness to undergo a costly hiring process will depend both on the wage paid and on the perceived likelihood of being hired, while a noisy interview leads the firm to consider the quality of the applicant pool when setting hiring standards. I characterize job-seekers' equilibrium application decision as well as the firm's equilibrium wage and hiring rule. I show that changes in the informativeness of job-seekers assessments, or changes in the informativeness of the firm's interview, affect the size and composition of the applicant pool, and can raise hiring costs when it dissuades applications. As a result, the firm may actually favor noisier interviews, or prefer to face applicants that are less certain of their person-job/organization fit.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.marshall.usc.edu/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2014 The Author, USC Marshall School of Business |
| Divisions: | Management |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L23 - Organization of Production |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Aug 2014 15:01 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 20:27 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/58673 |
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