Enforcing patent rights: an empirical study

Lanjouw, Jean O. and Schankerman, Mark ORCID: 0009-0006-1071-7672 (2003) Enforcing patent rights: an empirical study. In: Empirical Economics of Innovation and Patenting, 2003-03-14 - 2003-03-15, Mannheim, Germany, DEU.

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Abstract

We study the determinants of patent suits and settlements during 1978-1999 by linking information from the U.S. patent office, the federal courts and industry sources. Litigation risk is much higher for patents owned by individuals and smaller firms. Patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade, or other characteristics that facilitate “cooperative” resolution of disputes, are less likely to litigate. But post-suit outcomes do not depend on these characteristics. These findings show that small patentees are at a disadvantage in enforcing their patent rights since their greater litigation risk is not offset by more rapid resolution of their suits. Our empirical estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can help develop private patent litigation insurance to mitigate the adverse affects of high enforcement costs.

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Official URL:	http://www.zew.de/en/events/182
Additional Information:	© 2002 The Authors
Divisions:	Economics STICERD
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management K Law > K Law (General)
JEL classification:	K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K41 - Litigation Process O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Technological Change; Research and Development > O34 - Intellectual Property Rights: National and International Issues
Date Deposited:	31 Jul 2014 12:25
Last Modified:	01 Oct 2024 03:15
Funders:	National Academy of Sciences, Brookings Institution
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/58574

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