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Which worlds are possible?: a judgment aggregation problem

List, Christian ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X (2008) Which worlds are possible?: a judgment aggregation problem. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 37 (1). pp. 57-65. ISSN 0022-3611

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Identification Number: 10.1007/s10992-007-9058-y


Suppose the members of a group (e.g., committee, jury, expert panel) each form a judgment on which worlds in a given set are possible, subject to the constraint that at least one world is possible but not all are. The group seeks to aggregate these individual judgments into a collective judgment, subject to the same constraint. I show that no judgment aggregation rule can solve this problem in accordance with three conditions: “unanimity,” “independence” and “non-dictatorship,” Although the result is a variant of an existing theorem on “group identification” (Kasher and Rubinstein, Logique et Analyse 160:385–395, 1997), the aggregation of judgments on which worlds are possible (or permissible, desirable, etc.) appears not to have been studied yet. The result challenges us to take a stance on which of its conditions to relax.

Item Type: Article
Official URL:
Additional Information: © 2008 Springer
Divisions: Government
Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Date Deposited: 20 Jun 2008 11:50
Last Modified: 25 Jan 2024 01:15

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