The political economy of rationing health care in England and the US: the ‘accidental logics’ of political settlements

Bevan, Gwyn ORCID: 0000-0003-2123-3770 and Brown, Lawrence D. (2014) The political economy of rationing health care in England and the US: the ‘accidental logics’ of political settlements. Health Economics, Policy and Law, 9 (03). pp. 273-294. ISSN 1744-1331

Preview

PDF - Published Version Download (677kB) | Preview

Abstract

This article considers how the 'accidental logics' of political settlements for the English National Health Service (NHS) and the Medicare and Medicaid programmes in the United States have resulted in different institutional arrangements and different implicit social contracts for rationing, which we define to be the denial of health care that is beneficial but is deemed to be too costly. This article argues that rationing is designed into the English NHS and designed out of US Medicare; and compares rationing for the elderly in the United States and in England for acute care, care at the end of life, and chronic care.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJourna...
Additional Information:	© Cambridge University Press 2014.
Divisions:	Management
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions J Political Science > JL Political institutions (America except United States) J Political Science > JZ International relations
Date Deposited:	24 Jun 2014 14:37
Last Modified:	07 Nov 2024 02:51
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/57129

Actions (login required)

View Item