Power indices as an aid to institutional design : the generalised apportionment problem

Leech, Dennis (2002) Power indices as an aid to institutional design : the generalised apportionment problem. . Warwick Economic Research Papers, UK.

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Abstract

A priori voting power analysis can be useful in helping to design a weighted voting system that has certain intended properties. Power indices can help determine how many weighted votes each member should be allocated and what the decision rule should be. These choices can be made in the light of a requirement that there be a given distribution of power and/or a desired division of powers between individual members and the collective institution. This paper focuses on the former problem: choosing the weights given that the power indices and the decision rule are fixed exogenously.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL:	http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/VPP/
Additional Information:	Copyright © 2002 Dennis Leech. The authors gratefully acknowledge that work on this paper was partly supported by the Leverhulme Trust (Grant F/07-004m). LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk>) of the LSE Research Online website.
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	J Political Science > JC Political theory
Date Deposited:	17 Jan 2006
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 18:33
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/556

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