Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Careerist judges

Levy, Gilat (2003) Careerist judges. . Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

In this Paper I analyse how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations, as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the appellate court’s decision reveals whether the judge interpreted properly the law and allows the evaluator to assess the judge’s ability. The monitoring possibilities for the evaluator are therefore endogenous, because the probability of an appeal depends on the judge’s decision. I find that judges with career concerns tend to inefficiently contradict previous decisions. I also show that such judges behave more efficiently when elected by the public than when appointed by fellow superior judges.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://www.cepr.org
Additional Information: © 2003 Gilat Levy
Divisions: Economics
STICERD
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
K Law > K Law (General)
JEL classification: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Date Deposited: 05 Jun 2008 08:33
Last Modified: 15 Sep 2023 22:56
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5377

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item