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Robin Hood's compromise: land reforms, inequality, redistribution and moral hazard

Bandiera, Oriana and Levy, Gilat (2004) Robin Hood's compromise: land reforms, inequality, redistribution and moral hazard. 4410. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, UK.

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Abstract

This Paper analyses an unusually conservative type of redistribution. We take land from the very rich, as usual, but give it to the rich instead of the poor. We show that this type of reform reduces agency costs, thus increasing productivity, total surplus in the economy, and workers’ welfare. Compared to the classic redistribution ‘to the tiller’ it does worse in terms of equity and does not give the poor a collaterizable asset but it is likely to be more sustainable, both economically and politically.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL: http://www.cepr.org
Additional Information: © 2004 Oriana Bandiera and Gilat Levy
Library of Congress subject classification: H Social Sciences > HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Journal of Economic Literature Classification System: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
D - Microeconomics > D3 - Distribution > D30 - General
Sets: Collections > Economists Online
Departments > Economics
Research centres and groups > Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD)
Rights: http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/usingTheLibrary/academicSupport/OA/depositYourResearch.aspx
Identification Number: 4410
Date Deposited: 05 Jun 2008 08:21
URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/5376/

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