Prat, Andrea (1998) Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies. . Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
I introduce a microfounded model of campaign ¯nance with o±ce-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies make contributions to politicians according to a common agency framework. Politicians use contributions to ¯nance their electoral expenditures. Voters are not fooled by electoral expenditures: they are in°uenced in a way that is consistent with the equilibrium behavior of lobbies and politicians. The model is used to: (i) determine the relation between campaign spending and political deadweight; (ii) show the informational value of lobbies' contributions; (iii) evaluate the welfare implications of restricting campaign spending; and (iv) interpret the empirical ¯nding that campaign expenditures have a very low e®ect on election outcome. One can say that this model makes the best case in favor of campaign contributions. Nevertheless, under reasonable parameter values, a ban on campaign contributions is welfare-improving.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://center.uvt.nl |
| Additional Information: | © 1998 the author |
| Divisions: | Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M3 - Marketing and Advertising > M37 - Advertising D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Date Deposited: | 02 Jun 2008 10:26 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 19:40 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5224 |
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